|| shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||

Invocation (First verse of the laghuchandrikA - GauDabrahmAnandI)

namo navaghanashyAmakAmakAmitadehine |
kamalAkAmasaudAmakaNakAmukagehine ||

Obeisance to the householder (Krishna) whose appearance
resembles a fresh dark cloud, whose (beautiful) form
is desired even by kAmadeva (manmatha even though he is
extremely handsome himself), who desires the particles of flattened
rice brought by sudAmA the brAhmaNa, despite the fact that 
He is the desirer(Lord) of the Goddess of Wealth, kamalA (lakShmI).

nyAyAmR^ita: 

 shuktiGYAnena rUpyaM naShTamiti kadApyananubhavena tatrApyavyApteshcha |
 etAvantaM kAlaM shuktyaGYAnamAsId-bhrama AsIdityanubhavena shuktivatsatye 
 aGYAnabhramAdau shuktiGYAnena tadaGYAnaM naShTamityanubhavena GYAnatvena 
 GYAnanivartyatvasya sattvenAtivyApteshcha | 
 

VyAsa tIrtha says that there is never an experience of the destruction
of the silver due to the knowledge of nacre. No person ever feels, 
"The silver (of the illusion) was destroyed by the knowledge of the 
nacre" but only feels "all this while, there was an ignorance of nacre and
there was an illusion." Therefore the definition is too narrow (avyApti) and 
does not cover the case of the silver-on-nacre erroneous cognition (bhrama). In other
words, the knowledge of nacre does not remove the false silver.

However, there is the experience that the bhrama and ignorance (ajnAna) 
get destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre (shuktijnAna). But the 
ajnAna that has the a real substratum (nacre) is itself real. And this 
real ajnAna is removed by jnAna. This makes the 
definition suffer from the defect of being too wide (ativyApti), because
a real thing (the ignorance, aGYAna) is removed by knowledge (in its 
capacity as knowledge) and not an unreal thing. (Please see advaita-siddhi 18
for an explanation of GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva.)

 Summarizing his arguments, VyAsa tIrtha says:

             vijnAnanAshyatA mithyArUpyAdau nAnubhUyate |
             kiMtvadhiShThAnavat-satye tadajnAne .nubhUyate ||
             The destruction of an unreal thing due to knowledge, such as the 
             silver (in nacre), is not experienced. But, (the
             destruction) of the real ignorance of the substratum 
             (the nacre) is experienced.

What VyAsatIrtha means here is that there are two defects in the 
definition of mithyAtva - jnananivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h. 
1)Although the silver that is perceived in error instead of the
  nacre is mithyA (false), nobody experiences the destruction 
  (sublation) of this silver as being due to knowledge. 
  Therefore the definition is too narrow, since it does not 
  apply to a thing that is mithyA.
2) The ignorance of the nacre which is the substratum (of the
   false silver) is real. However, it is this ignorance that 
   gets destroyed by the knowledge of the substratum, nacre. 
   Therefore the definition is too wide, because it applies to 
   a thing, the ignorance, that is not mithyA.

It is necessary to understand the mAdhva explanation of error or
ayathArthajnAna. This is stated in the prAmANapaddhati of JayatIrtha:

asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityuttarakAlInAnubhavAchchhuktireva-
atyanta-asadrajatAtmanA pratibhAtItyAchAryAH |

(With respect to the error of silver in nacre), the experience
"The false silver appeared (before me)" occurs after (the bhrama
is over). It follows that the nacre itself appears as the 
absolutely false silver. This is what the AchArya (madhvAchArya)
says.

This is based on Madhva's theory of error that is put forth, for 
example in the ViShNu-tattva-vinirNaya:

 na cha shukteH rajatatvaM sadasadvilakShaNam.h |
 asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityanubhavAt.h ||

 The (erroneous) silverness of the nacre is not different
 from reality and unreality (as claimed by advaitins) because of the
 experience "the false silver appeared" (after the illusion
 has ended). 

Janardana's TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati makes it clear that 
the mAdhva position is different from the naiyAyika position.

nanu evaM naiyAyikamatAnna visheSha AchAryamatasya | tairapi 
shuktAvavidyamAna-deshAntarIya-rajatAtmatayA shukterbhAnAN^gI-
kArAdityata Aha "atyanteti" | kutrApi kadA .pyavidyamAnetyarthaH |

To meet the objection: "This position of MadhvAchArya does not differ from the 
naiyAyika position. Even they (naiyAyikas) accept that the silver that does not
occur in the nacre occurs elsewhere  and it appears (erroneously) in the nacre.",
(the AchArya) uses the term "atyanta". (This means) that which
does not occur anywhere, at any time. 

The mAdhvas, however, ignore what happens *during* the illusion phase, since
their emphasis is on the reflection *after* the illusion is over (bhramottarakAle
shuktiviShyakaparAmarshAt.h). 
For example, there is no explanation of how or why there is an activity (pravR^itti)
based on the illusory object, silver. A person may, upon mistaking the nacre to be
silver, proceed to pick it up.  mAnameyodaya, a treatise on the pUrva mImAMsA, remarks,
in different context, how this pravR^itti is to be considered. 

"tattat.h GYAnasya svaviShaya eva pravR^ittikaratvaniyamAdrajataGYAnasyApi 
 idaMviShayatvAbhAve tatra pravR^ittirna sidhyet.h" 
 

 Any cognition can only lead to activity based on its own object or content (of the 
 cognition). Therefore, if the object (content) of the cognition of silver is not
 the "this" (the object lying before the person under illusion), then there would
 be no activity in this case. 

The mAdhva theory of error, referred to as abhinava-anyathAkhyAti by ShrI rAghavendra
svAmI in his TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati, differs from those of other realist 
systems such as nyAya and vishiShTa-advaita. nyAya puts forth 
what is termed anyathAkhyAti. What is seen is silver that is
present elsewhere but is (erroneously) presented here in place
of the nacre. "sarvathA .asatve pratItyanupapattestatraiva 
sattve vA bAdhAnupapattiriti" - If the silver were completely
false, it would not have appeared (before the observer). If it
were present right in the place where it was perceived, there
would be no sublation (of such a perception).
The maNikaNa, a summary of the tattvachintAmaNi of Gangesha, 
says - "rajatatvena purovartinaM jAnAmi ityanuvyavasAyAd-
eva anyathAkhyAtisiddhiH" - by the realization "I cognize what
is before me as silver", the cognition of one thing as another
(anyathAkhyAti) is established.

advaita-siddhi text:

GYAna-prayukta-avasthitisAmAnya-viraha-pratiyogitvaM hi 
GYAnanivartyatvam.h | avasthitishcha dvedhA; svarUpeNa 
kAraNAtmanA cha ; satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h | tathAcha 
mudgarapAtena ghaTasya svarUpeNa-avasthitivirahe .api 
kAraNAtmanA avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h brahmaGYAnaprayukta
eva sa iti nAtItaghaTAdAv-avyAptiH| 

GYAnaprayukta - that which is concomitant with GYAna 
of the substratum, avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - negation 
of existence in general, pratiyogitvaM - counterpositive,
hi - exactly, GYAnanivartyatvam.h - sublatability by 
GYAna, avasthitishcha - and existence, dvedhA- of two 
kinds, svarUpeNa - in its own form, kAraNAtmanA cha -
and in the form of the cause, satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h -
since it is admitted in accordance with the theory of 
satkAryavAda, tathAcha - accordingly,  mudgarapAtena -
by the stroke of a hammer, ghaTasya svarUpeNa - in the
form of a pot, avasthitivirahe .api - even though there
is a negation of existence, kAraNAtmanA - in the form 
of its cause, avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h - due to the 
absence of negation of the existence, brahmaGYAnaprayukta 
eva sa - it is only by GYAna of Brahman, iti - thus,
na - no, atItaghaTAdau - in the case of things of the past
such as the pot (after destruction), avyAptiH - the defect
of being too narrow in definition. 

Translation
------------
GYAnanivartyatva or the property of being sublated by 
GYAna is exactly the property of being the counterpositive
of a negation of existence in general (all forms) such that
the GYAna of the substratum is concomitant with the negation.
And existence of a thing can be of two kinds - 1) in its own
form and 2) in the form of the cause, since this follows from
the theory of satkAryavAda that holds that the effect exists 
in the cause (in a causal form). Accordingly, even though there
is a negation of the existence of a pot in its form due to stroke
of a hammer, there is no negation of existence of the pot in
its causal form (after being destroyed by a hammer, because the
pot still exists in its causal form as clay from which it was 
originally produced). The (negation of existence in its causal
form) is only by the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the definition
of mithyAtva is not too narrow (as you contend), in the case of 
things of the past such as a pot (after being struck by a hammer). 

It is important to understand the term "GYAnaprayukta" as used by
MadhusUdana here. BrahmAnanda defines it in his GauDabrahmAnandI 
as "adhiShThAnatatvaGYAnavyApaka", ie. such that the cognition 
of the substratum is concomitant with it (ie. the negation of 
existence in all forms). This is equivalent to saying:

Wherever there is the cognition of the substratum there is the
negation of the thing that is mithyA (superimposed on the substratum)
in all its forms. 

avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - BrahmAnanda defines it as "svasvIyasaMskAra-
anyatarasya-abhAva, the negation of (a thing) as itself and its
saMskAra, reminiscent impression. In the case of aGYAna, ignorance,
MadhusUdana's expression "svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha" means "aGYAna-
tatprayuktasvarUpeNa sthUla-avasthAkAraNIbhUta-saMskArarupeNa cha",
aGYAna and the reminiscent impression that is the cause of its gross
form and that the aGYAna is concomitant with.  

MadhusUdana continues:

ataevottaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne na siddhasAdhanam.h; navA
viyadAdau brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api tadvadeva mithyAtva-asiddhyA-
arthAntaram.h; uttaraGYAnena lInasya pUrvaGYAnasya svakAraNAtmanA-
avasthAnAdavasthitisAmAnyaviraha-anupapatteH |

ataeva - Precisely for this reason,  uttaraGYAnanivartye - in
the case of the sublation due to a subsequent cognition, pUrvaGYAne
- (of) the previous cognition, na siddhasAdhanam.h - there is no 
redundant proof (on our part), navA- nor, viyadAdau - in the case of
space (AkAsha), etc., brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api - even if they are
destroyed by knowledge of Brahman, tadvadeva - in the same way, 
mithyAtva asiddhyA - by the fact that unreality is not established,
arthAntaram.h - proving something other than what was to be proved
uttaraGYAnena - by the subsequent cognition, lInasya - of the sublated 
pUrvaGYAnasya - of the previous cognition, svakAraNAtmanA - in its causal
form, avasthAnAt.h - due to existing, avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - negation 
of existence in general, anupapatteH - due to not being established.

Translation:

For this reason, there can be no charge of a redundant proof in the 
case of the sublation of a previous cognition by a subsequent cognition.
Nor can there be a charge of proving something other than what was intended
to be proved in the case of space, etc., that are destroyed by knowledge of
Brahman, on the grounds that their unreality is not established in the same 
way (that the unreality of a previous cognition is not established). This 
follows from the fact that the previous cognition exists in its causal form
and thus the negation of its existence in general cannot be established.

In the case of a cognition being sublated by a subsequent cognition, the 
first cognition continues to exist in its causal state (as saMskAra or 
reminiscent impression in the mind). In the case of a things such as AkAsha,
or anything in the world of duality, being destroyed by Brahman knowledge, 
there is total destruction of these things in their causal and own forms as
well. It cannot be claimed that the unreality of these things is not established
and that there is an error of proving something other than what was intended
to be proved. 

Anand