|| shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||
Invocation (First verse of the laghuchandrikA - GauDabrahmAnandI)
namo navaghanashyAmakAmakAmitadehine | kamalAkAmasaudAmakaNakAmukagehine ||
Obeisance to the householder (Krishna) whose appearance resembles a fresh dark cloud, whose (beautiful) form is desired even by kAmadeva (manmatha even though he is extremely handsome himself), who desires the particles of flattened rice brought by sudAmA the brAhmaNa, despite the fact that He is the desirer(Lord) of the Goddess of Wealth, kamalA (lakShmI).
shuktiGYAnena rUpyaM naShTamiti kadApyananubhavena tatrApyavyApteshcha | etAvantaM kAlaM shuktyaGYAnamAsId-bhrama AsIdityanubhavena shuktivatsatye aGYAnabhramAdau shuktiGYAnena tadaGYAnaM naShTamityanubhavena GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatvasya sattvenAtivyApteshcha |
VyAsa tIrtha says that there is never an experience of the destruction of the silver due to the knowledge of nacre. No person ever feels, "The silver (of the illusion) was destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre" but only feels "all this while, there was an ignorance of nacre and there was an illusion." Therefore the definition is too narrow (avyApti) and does not cover the case of the silver-on-nacre erroneous cognition (bhrama). In other words, the knowledge of nacre does not remove the false silver.
However, there is the experience that the bhrama and ignorance (ajnAna) get destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre (shuktijnAna). But the ajnAna that has the a real substratum (nacre) is itself real. And this real ajnAna is removed by jnAna. This makes the definition suffer from the defect of being too wide (ativyApti), because a real thing (the ignorance, aGYAna) is removed by knowledge (in its capacity as knowledge) and not an unreal thing. (Please see advaita-siddhi 18 for an explanation of GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva.)
Summarizing his arguments, VyAsa tIrtha says:
vijnAnanAshyatA mithyArUpyAdau nAnubhUyate | kiMtvadhiShThAnavat-satye tadajnAne .nubhUyate || The destruction of an unreal thing due to knowledge, such as the silver (in nacre), is not experienced. But, (the destruction) of the real ignorance of the substratum (the nacre) is experienced.
What VyAsatIrtha means here is that there are two defects in the definition of mithyAtva - jnananivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h. 1)Although the silver that is perceived in error instead of the nacre is mithyA (false), nobody experiences the destruction (sublation) of this silver as being due to knowledge. Therefore the definition is too narrow, since it does not apply to a thing that is mithyA. 2) The ignorance of the nacre which is the substratum (of the false silver) is real. However, it is this ignorance that gets destroyed by the knowledge of the substratum, nacre. Therefore the definition is too wide, because it applies to a thing, the ignorance, that is not mithyA.
It is necessary to understand the mAdhva explanation of error or ayathArthajnAna. This is stated in the prAmANapaddhati of JayatIrtha:
asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityuttarakAlInAnubhavAchchhuktireva- atyanta-asadrajatAtmanA pratibhAtItyAchAryAH |
(With respect to the error of silver in nacre), the experience "The false silver appeared (before me)" occurs after (the bhrama is over). It follows that the nacre itself appears as the absolutely false silver. This is what the AchArya (madhvAchArya) says.
This is based on Madhva's theory of error that is put forth, for example in the ViShNu-tattva-vinirNaya:
na cha shukteH rajatatvaM sadasadvilakShaNam.h | asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityanubhavAt.h ||
The (erroneous) silverness of the nacre is not different from reality and unreality (as claimed by advaitins) because of the experience "the false silver appeared" (after the illusion has ended).
Janardana's TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati makes it clear that the mAdhva position is different from the naiyAyika position.
nanu evaM naiyAyikamatAnna visheSha AchAryamatasya | tairapi shuktAvavidyamAna-deshAntarIya-rajatAtmatayA shukterbhAnAN^gI- kArAdityata Aha "atyanteti" | kutrApi kadA .pyavidyamAnetyarthaH |
To meet the objection: "This position of MadhvAchArya does not differ from the naiyAyika position. Even they (naiyAyikas) accept that the silver that does not occur in the nacre occurs elsewhere and it appears (erroneously) in the nacre.", (the AchArya) uses the term "atyanta". (This means) that which does not occur anywhere, at any time.
The mAdhvas, however, ignore what happens *during* the illusion phase, since their emphasis is on the reflection *after* the illusion is over (bhramottarakAle shuktiviShyakaparAmarshAt.h). For example, there is no explanation of how or why there is an activity (pravR^itti) based on the illusory object, silver. A person may, upon mistaking the nacre to be silver, proceed to pick it up. mAnameyodaya, a treatise on the pUrva mImAMsA, remarks, in different context, how this pravR^itti is to be considered.
"tattat.h GYAnasya svaviShaya eva pravR^ittikaratvaniyamAdrajataGYAnasyApi idaMviShayatvAbhAve tatra pravR^ittirna sidhyet.h"
Any cognition can only lead to activity based on its own object or content (of the cognition). Therefore, if the object (content) of the cognition of silver is not the "this" (the object lying before the person under illusion), then there would be no activity in this case.
The mAdhva theory of error, referred to as abhinava-anyathAkhyAti by ShrI rAghavendra svAmI in his TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati, differs from those of other realist systems such as nyAya and vishiShTa-advaita. nyAya puts forth what is termed anyathAkhyAti. What is seen is silver that is present elsewhere but is (erroneously) presented here in place of the nacre. "sarvathA .asatve pratItyanupapattestatraiva sattve vA bAdhAnupapattiriti" - If the silver were completely false, it would not have appeared (before the observer). If it were present right in the place where it was perceived, there would be no sublation (of such a perception). The maNikaNa, a summary of the tattvachintAmaNi of Gangesha, says - "rajatatvena purovartinaM jAnAmi ityanuvyavasAyAd- eva anyathAkhyAtisiddhiH" - by the realization "I cognize what is before me as silver", the cognition of one thing as another (anyathAkhyAti) is established.
GYAna-prayukta-avasthitisAmAnya-viraha-pratiyogitvaM hi GYAnanivartyatvam.h | avasthitishcha dvedhA; svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha ; satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h | tathAcha mudgarapAtena ghaTasya svarUpeNa-avasthitivirahe .api kAraNAtmanA avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h brahmaGYAnaprayukta eva sa iti nAtItaghaTAdAv-avyAptiH|
GYAnaprayukta - that which is concomitant with GYAna of the substratum, avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - negation of existence in general, pratiyogitvaM - counterpositive, hi - exactly, GYAnanivartyatvam.h - sublatability by GYAna, avasthitishcha - and existence, dvedhA- of two kinds, svarUpeNa - in its own form, kAraNAtmanA cha - and in the form of the cause, satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h - since it is admitted in accordance with the theory of satkAryavAda, tathAcha - accordingly, mudgarapAtena - by the stroke of a hammer, ghaTasya svarUpeNa - in the form of a pot, avasthitivirahe .api - even though there is a negation of existence, kAraNAtmanA - in the form of its cause, avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h - due to the absence of negation of the existence, brahmaGYAnaprayukta eva sa - it is only by GYAna of Brahman, iti - thus, na - no, atItaghaTAdau - in the case of things of the past such as the pot (after destruction), avyAptiH - the defect of being too narrow in definition.
Translation ------------ GYAnanivartyatva or the property of being sublated by GYAna is exactly the property of being the counterpositive of a negation of existence in general (all forms) such that the GYAna of the substratum is concomitant with the negation. And existence of a thing can be of two kinds - 1) in its own form and 2) in the form of the cause, since this follows from the theory of satkAryavAda that holds that the effect exists in the cause (in a causal form). Accordingly, even though there is a negation of the existence of a pot in its form due to stroke of a hammer, there is no negation of existence of the pot in its causal form (after being destroyed by a hammer, because the pot still exists in its causal form as clay from which it was originally produced). The (negation of existence in its causal form) is only by the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the definition of mithyAtva is not too narrow (as you contend), in the case of things of the past such as a pot (after being struck by a hammer).
It is important to understand the term "GYAnaprayukta" as used by MadhusUdana here. BrahmAnanda defines it in his GauDabrahmAnandI as "adhiShThAnatatvaGYAnavyApaka", ie. such that the cognition of the substratum is concomitant with it (ie. the negation of existence in all forms). This is equivalent to saying:
Wherever there is the cognition of the substratum there is the negation of the thing that is mithyA (superimposed on the substratum) in all its forms.
avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - BrahmAnanda defines it as "svasvIyasaMskAra- anyatarasya-abhAva, the negation of (a thing) as itself and its saMskAra, reminiscent impression. In the case of aGYAna, ignorance, MadhusUdana's expression "svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha" means "aGYAna- tatprayuktasvarUpeNa sthUla-avasthAkAraNIbhUta-saMskArarupeNa cha", aGYAna and the reminiscent impression that is the cause of its gross form and that the aGYAna is concomitant with.
ataevottaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne na siddhasAdhanam.h; navA viyadAdau brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api tadvadeva mithyAtva-asiddhyA- arthAntaram.h; uttaraGYAnena lInasya pUrvaGYAnasya svakAraNAtmanA- avasthAnAdavasthitisAmAnyaviraha-anupapatteH |
ataeva - Precisely for this reason, uttaraGYAnanivartye - in the case of the sublation due to a subsequent cognition, pUrvaGYAne - (of) the previous cognition, na siddhasAdhanam.h - there is no redundant proof (on our part), navA- nor, viyadAdau - in the case of space (AkAsha), etc., brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api - even if they are destroyed by knowledge of Brahman, tadvadeva - in the same way, mithyAtva asiddhyA - by the fact that unreality is not established, arthAntaram.h - proving something other than what was to be proved uttaraGYAnena - by the subsequent cognition, lInasya - of the sublated pUrvaGYAnasya - of the previous cognition, svakAraNAtmanA - in its causal form, avasthAnAt.h - due to existing, avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - negation of existence in general, anupapatteH - due to not being established.
For this reason, there can be no charge of a redundant proof in the case of the sublation of a previous cognition by a subsequent cognition. Nor can there be a charge of proving something other than what was intended to be proved in the case of space, etc., that are destroyed by knowledge of Brahman, on the grounds that their unreality is not established in the same way (that the unreality of a previous cognition is not established). This follows from the fact that the previous cognition exists in its causal form and thus the negation of its existence in general cannot be established.
In the case of a cognition being sublated by a subsequent cognition, the first cognition continues to exist in its causal state (as saMskAra or reminiscent impression in the mind). In the case of a things such as AkAsha, or anything in the world of duality, being destroyed by Brahman knowledge, there is total destruction of these things in their causal and own forms as well. It cannot be claimed that the unreality of these things is not established and that there is an error of proving something other than what was intended to be proved.